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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A STUDY ON THE NEW INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN KOREA AND ITS CONFORMITY TO THE 
WTO ASCM 
 
By 
 
Young-Hwan Sohn 
 
To go over material on Korea's foreign investment incentives and to see if it conforms 
to WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  And, to search for 
way to improve and amend when and where necessary. There have been no cases where 
non-conformities between investment incentives and the WTO Agreement that grew 
into international trade disputes.  That is, to date, no countries have complained to the 
WTO that tax benefits or subsidies granted for foreign investment inducement purposes 
by another country in jurisdiction harmed the former country in any way, nor has any 
country ever taken countervailing measures against another country.  A 
comprehensive look at international disputes concerning subsidies has shown that there 
is no clear answer as to whether investment incentives cause any complications in 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies.  It can therefore be concluded that no clear 
internationally recognized criteria or positions on foreign investment and investment 
incentives have been presented so far. 
Although it has not been raised as an international issue yet, seeing that more and 
more countries are providing more and more incentives in order to induce more 
investment in their own countries, there is real and noteworthy enough possibility of 
disputes arising from non-conformities between investment incentives offered and 
implementation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
Seen from this perspective, it is important that Korea takes a look at its new investment 
incentives and see if it goes against any part of the WTO Agreement and make any 
revisions necessary in order to prevent potential disputes from surfacing. 
 
Korea's investment incentive system may be in conflict with some provisions of the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  Such conflicts, or non-
conformities, as pointed out in the previous sections should be amended as soon as 
possible in the following way.  First, delete export rate and domestic procurement rate 
criteria from incentives related to reduction/exemption of rents and parceling prices for 
public properties owned by local governments.  Second, adopt a much wider concept 
of industries for incentives provided to business dealing with high technology and 
industrial support services. 
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1. Background 
 
Korea experienced the fastest economic growth of all developing countries and was 
envied and admired by many countries around the world.  With the hosting of the 
1986 Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympics, it was growing into an economically 
powerful country until it faced one of the worst crisis in its modern history in late 
1997.  With the financial crisis, Korea's and its financial institutions' credit ranking 
fell to that of underdeveloped countries for a while. 
 
Many factors contributed to this recent hardship.  One of these factors is that, 
compared to other countries, Korea did not pay enough attention to inducing foreign 
investment and its domestic conditions were not appropriate for foreign investors to 
make their investments.  Following this in early, Korea gave its investment 
incentives almost a complete facelift.  This study attempt to find out if the newly 
implemented investment incentive system is in conformity with international 
standards, especially the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
By taking a look at parts that do or do not conform, an attempt is also made to suggest 
the ways and directions in which Korea's investment incentives should be headed. 
 
 
 
2. Purpose 
 
To go over material on Korea's foreign investment incentives and to see if it conforms 
to WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  And, to search for 
way to improve and amend when and where necessary. 
 
 
3. Method 
 
This paper is organized in the following manner: 
Purposes and methods of research, theoretical review of investment incentive, WTO 
agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures, specificity in granting subsidy, 
types, and features of subsidies, Korea’s investment incentive system and WTO 
agreement, and future directions for Korea investment incentive system. Study was 
mostly done by looking into documents on investment incentives and laws and 
regulations related to it. 
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II. THEORETICAL REVIEW OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES 
 
1. Theoretical Basis for Investment Incentives 
 
A. General Investment Incentives 
 
The theoretical basis for investment incentive was first raised by A. Pigou and was 
from the welfare economics point of view.  It focuses on how the market doesn’t 
properly reflect positive externalities generated through investment in production.  
There is a need to correct the differences and investment incentive offers one way of 
doing that.  Positive externalities may originate from the economy of scale, creation 
of new technologies and intelligence, and improvement of worker’s functions.  A 
difference can occur between the social rates of return and the producers of these 
positive externalities or spillover effects because they cannot be enjoyed in full by the 
investors.  The argument is that such differences must be compensated through 
investment incentives if investment is to be optimized throughout the society 
(Lee/Lee 1998, p. 18). 
 
The fact that investment incentive can be provided is also raised from the standpoint 
of economic development theory.  The most representative example would be 
arguments relating to the protection of inducing industries.  That is, the advantages 
generated from increased investment and lower unit production costs may often be not 
fully absorbed due to an immature market.  In these cases, it may be necessary to 
offer incentives to these businesses so that they may become more efficient and more 
competitive.  Incentives seen as necessary from such point of view were actually 
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offered in Korea in the past and in newly industrializing East Asian countries 
(Lee/Lee 1998, pp. 18-19). 
 
B. Incentives Provided to Foreign Investment 
 
The basis for investment incentives in the previous section is seen from general 
perspectives.  This section will look into the economic basis for investment incentive 
offered to foreign investors.  Incentives on foreign investment is offered for the same 
basic reason as general investment incentive, that is to maintain the differences in 
social and personal (private) rates of return on investment.  Only difference is that in 
the case of foreign investment, special circumstances that accompany foreign 
investment must also be taken into consideration when considering the rates of return. 
 
Foreign investment does not just mean simple transfer of capital.  Foreign 
investment involved transfer of various intangible assets, including technology, 
management know-how, skills, and usage of networks of multi-national corporations.  
If a foreign investor can internalize all these intangible assets, investment return rates 
will be able to reflect the net benefits of investment and incentive may not be 
necessary.  The portions that are not internalized by foreign investing companies are 
transferred to investment inducing countries as positive externalities.  In this case, 
the investment inducing country’s incentives to foreign investors can be justified 
(Lee/Lee 1998, p. 19). 
 
Foreign investment may not only bring transfer of externalities, such as technology 
and other intangible assets, but may also bring differences between social and private 
 3
investment rate returns in the investment inducing country through externalities that 
ensue the pervasive effects of industry and economies of scale. 
 
Two other arguments are raised as bases for incentives in addition to incentives 
following the differences between foreign investment’s social and private rates of 
return on investment.  First, incentives may be offered as compensation when 
government interference results in falling short of expected profits.  Most typical 
example of this is where developing countries give customs duty exemptions to 
foreign investment companies in importing capital materials, parts and raw materials.  
When it is deemed that some specific policies implement by the investment inducing 
country are causes for curtailed rates of return on investment, a direct step must be 
taken to amend that policy.  However, this may be difficult for the investment 
inducing country to do due to various policy priorities that must be considered.  In 
these instances, an alternative approach to solving these problems may be to offer 
incentives (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 19). 
 
Second, incentives may be offered in order to compensate for the costs incurred to the 
foreign investor due to public services not provided by the investment inducing 
country.  When the investment inducing country’s public education system is lacking 
and cannot produce technically skillful personnel needed by the foreign investment 
companies, the investment inducing country may subsidize, in part or in whole, the 
costs that go into education and training of such labor (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 20). 
 
 
2. Different Types of Investment Incentives 
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There are many different types of incentives.  In particular, since the late 1980s, 
incentives on foreign investment have been diversifying as countries worldwide 
competed in offering incentives to induce more foreign investment.  Even within one 
country, different incentives may be offered by different levels of governments 
(central and local governments).  Further, these various incentives differ greatly in 
their objectives. 
 
Despite this diversity in investment incentives, they can largely be divided into two 
categories: fiscal incentives and financial incentives).  Incentives that do not fall 
under neither of these categories but are nonetheless incentives related to investment 
can, for the sake of convenience, be called miscellaneous incentives.  Fiscal 
incentives are utilized far more by underdeveloped or developing countries than by 
developed countries.  The more developed the country, the more they tend to offer 
financial incentives.  The reason that fiscal incentives are used more by 
underdeveloped and developing countries seems to be that direct financial subsidies 
are burdensome on the their expenditure (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 20-21). 
 
A. Fiscal Incentives 
 
Fiscal incentive is the type used most for foreign investment.  According to a study 
done by UNCTAD, in the early 1990s, only 4 of the countries surveyed did not offer 
fiscal incentives to foreign investors.  And, a comparison of mid 1980s and early 
1990s showed that use of fiscal incentives is rising without changing much in form. 
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The most representative form is the reduction in corporate tax.  The standard rate of 
corporate tax that applies to all companies are reduced for foreign investment 
companies.  In some cases, the corporate tax is exempted all together.  This is 
called the “tax holiday” and generally lasts for the initial 5 years following the 
investment.  Depending on circumstances, this holiday may be extended and may 
last as long as 10-25 years. 
 
In anticipation of not being able to enjoy the tax benefits during the tax 
exemption/reduction period due to inability to produce profits, sometimes these losses 
are permitted to be countervailed against future profits. 
 
Instead of direct curtailing of the tax rate of giving a tax holiday, another form of 
fiscal incentive is to lower tax rates all across the schedule or to deduct a set amount 
from the taxes due.  This form of incentive is usually employed in developed 
countries (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 21). 
 
 
1. Fiscal Incentive 
z Exemption/Reduction of corporate tax 
z Full exemption of all taxes 
z Countervailing of losses incurred during tax holiday against future profits 
z Recognition of accelerated repayment 
z Deduction on investment and reinvestments 
z Reduction/Exemption of social welfare charges 
z Earnings deduction based on employment related expenditures 
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z Earnings deduction based on specific expenditures (e.g. related to marketing 
and promotional activities) 
z Tax exemption/reduction based on added values created 
- Tax exemption/reduction based on procurement in invested country 
- Recognize tax deduction of added values created 
z Import related incentives 
- Exemption of customs duty on imports of capital materials, parts and raw 
materials 
- Tax deduction of import duties 
z Export related incentives 
- Exemption of export duties 
- Tax benefits on profits produced from exporting 
- Tax benefits on certain future exchange revenues 
- Link export records with domestic sales to give tax exemption/reduction 
- Drawback of customs duties 
- Tax deduction for amount founded on procurements obtained solely in the 
invested country 
- Earnings deduction on capital expenditures and overseas expenditures for 
export industry 
 
2. Financial Incentives 
z Direct capital subsidy related to investment project or subsidies on production 
and marketing costs 
z Loans in the character of subsidies 
z Payment guarantees 
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z Export letter of credit guarantee 
z Public venture capital participating in high-risk businesses 
z Special rate government insurance for foreign exchange fluctuations, 
devaluation and other non-commercial risks 
 
3. Other Incentives 
z Assistance in providing infrastructures 
z Technical support and other support services including securing funds 
procurement, project execution and management, advance study on investment, 
market information, study on the possibility of raw material supplies, provide 
production quality control and marketing technology, education & training and 
reeducation, development of know-how 
z Priority on government procurements 
z Market entrance restrictions and monopoly rights 
z Protection from import economies 
z Special measures in relation to foreign exchanges 
 
Source: UNCTAD-DTCI (1996), World Investment Report, 1996, Table IV, 4. p. 180. 
in Brewer/Young (1997), p. 181. 
 
For example, instead of depreciation for fixed assets such as factory and equipment, 
accelerated repayment or immediate refund is allowed so that foreign investors can 
adjust their tax profits to fit their own (different) circumstances.  Another method is 
to deduct a certain amount of total investment from the taxes due.  Or, earning 
deduction method is criticized also and deducts a certain employment related costs 
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from tax standards.  Sometimes a connection is made between specific outcomes of 
the foreign investment with tax reductions.  For example, relating local contents to 
tax reduction.  In some cases, social security contributions, which are not taxes but 
which by nature are forced, are exempted. 
 
There are also fiscal incentives that are related to foreign investment company's 
imports and exports, like exempting import duties on capital materials, parts and raw 
materials that a foreign investment company imports for its business.  And 
international practices indicate that such exemption of customs duties last for about 5 
to 10 years, sometimes 15-25 years.  Fiscal incentives related to import/exports of 
foreign investment companies are more commonly offered to free trade zones. 
 
Fiscal incentives are also offered in relation to exports of foreign investment 
companies.  The most representative being exemption of export duties.  And 
sometimes special earnings deductions or tax deductions are applied to profits 
produced from exports.  In particular, tax benefits are given to exports that bring 
about foreign currency revenues.  Or, capital expenditures from exporting companies 
are recognized as special costs at times when calculating taxes (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 23). 
 
Countries competing to offer fiscal incentives to attract foreign investment may 
trigger harmful tax competition.  It especially refers to when geographically closed 
located countries lower tax burdens in order to induce foreign investment bringing 
about discords among those countries or even may be giving rise to financial dangers 
in some of those countries.  In can be said that Korea's extending the period of tax 
exemption/reduction to 10 in enacting the Foreign Investment Promotion Act had 
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more than a little to do with offering competitive tax benefits compared to that of 
other major foreign investment inducing countries in Asia like Malaysia (Lee/Lee 
1998, p. 24). 
 
And, although EU is intensifying economic unification by introducing a unified 
currency in 1999, individual member countries are showing signs of lowering taxes 
on capitals with high mobility to attract foreign investment.  In order to prevent 
harmful tax competition under global economy system, OECD believes that 
international understanding and establishment of action and penal codes are necessary.  
Recently, EU actually did enact the Code of Good Practices for Business Taxation, 
even though it is unbinding (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 24). 
 
 
B. Financial Incentives 
 
Financial incentive is where foreign investment companies receive direct financial 
benefits aside form taxes.  According to a study done by UNCTAD, in the early 
1990s, 59 of the 83 countries studied provided financial incentives.  it was also 
shown that financial incentives are offered more by developed countries. 
 
The most representative form of financial incentive is to provide subsidy on 
investment related capital investment or to subsidize production or marketing costs.  
Most of the financial incentives offered to foreign companies in USA or UK are 
offered by the central government, larger local government bodies, or other levels of 
local governments.  Financial incentives are usually related to the size of 
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employment.  UK's Regional Selective Assistance is in this category.  These types 
of assistance have advantage in that they are easy to manage because a provision can 
be inserted in the regulation stipulating that the assistance already paid may be 
retrieved should the conditions for investment not be met (Lee/Lee 1998, pp. 24-25). 
 
There are various other types financial incentives available in addition to direct cash 
assistance.  One of these is providing loans at low interest rates.  Or, another way is 
for the investment inducing country to provide payment guarantee to the foreign 
investment company in obtaining loans.  The government of the investment inducing 
country or its public financial institution may provide guarantees on export letter of 
credit also.  At times, government contributed public funds may be invested jointly 
with the foreign investment in high-risk investment projects.  Sometimes, 
government insurance that apply special rates to changes in foreign exchange rates, 
devaluation, and other non-commercial risks are provided as financial incentives 
(Lee/Lee 1998, p. 25). 
 
 
C. Other Types of Incentives 
 
There are other ways and aspects in which foreign investment companies may receive 
assistance from the investment induced governments which cannot clearly be defined 
as either fiscal incentive or financial incentive.  For example, the government may 
build social overhead capital (SOC) facilities that the foreign investment company 
needs.  Providing various other forms of assistance services may also be seen as 
types of incentives. 
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Supports in infrastructures and other services in Korea's Free Trade Zones, UK's 
special industrial regions, and high-tech industrial complexes in other countries are 
good examples of incentives that come in the form of provision of SOCs and other 
supportive services (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 25). 
 
Many different types of services can be included in the support services that foreign 
investment companies may receive in the process of their investment and business 
activities.  For example, capital providers may be found and introduced to foreign 
investors.  Or, technical support or other support services may be provided, including 
project execution and management, advance study on investment, learn market 
information, seek raw material sources, technical support in production control and 
marketing, education & training and re-education programs, and development of 
know-how. 
 
Government procurement companies may give priority to foreign investment 
companies as a way of providing special benefits and incentives.  Incentive may also 
include restricting other companies from entering the market or giving monopoly 
rights to foreign investors.  These types of incentives are used most often by 
underdeveloped countries and central/eastern European countries.   Further, special 
measures concerning foreign exchanges are sometimes permitted (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 
26). 
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3. Effects of Investment Incentives 
 
Most countries, in order to attract foreign investment to their countries, offer diverse 
forms of incentives.  However, many research results show that incentives are not 
decisive factors in foreign investment companies, especially multi-national companies, 
in selecting where to invest.  For multi-national companies, factors that they consider 
important in their selection are size of the market and it growth possibilities, 
production costs, level of technology, infrastructure, political and social stability, and 
regulatory restrictions.  In an actual study done by 30 multi-national companies on 
74 investment projects in the areas of automobile, computer, petrochemical and food 
processing industries concluded that investment incentives were not considered at all 
in their decision making (Lee/Lee 1998, p.26). 
 
However, this study did positively prove that general opinion that investment 
incentives do contribute making an attractive investment opportunity even more 
attractive.  Although there are research results that show that incentive can effect the 
overall flow of investment, but still with little difference in results that show that 
incentives do not play an important role in investment decisions.  However, when a 
general region of investment has been chosen but not a specific area or country (e.g. a 
Korean company saw the dire need to invest in Europe and had decided make the 
investment and is looking for a specific location of investment), incentives have been 
shown to have an important effect in specific location selection.  That is, investment 
incentives play a pivotal role in deciding whether the company will choose Scotland, 
select Wales instead, or whether it decides to invest in Northern France.  In cases like 
European Union where market unification effects are deepening, in the final stages of 
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reviewing where candidates for investment are narrowed to 2 or 3 areas, investment 
incentive factors make up for the overall investment environment and, thereby, may 
become a major element in selecting where to make the investment (Kim 1997, p.128). 
 
Foreign investors show different reactions to different types of incentives depending 
on their strategies.  Export-oriented foreign investors to whom cheap labor is 
important, prefer fiscal incentives over market protection or other types of incentives.  
On the other hand, market-oriented investors would obviously prefer incentives like 
market protection over fiscal ones.  Where incentive provided at regional level are 
concerned, it has been shown that cash assistance is much more effective than fiscal 
incentives in inducing investment.  Recently, many countries have been offering 
incentives for transfer of advanced technology, for establishment of research & 
development centers, etc.  Some researches have concluded that creation of free 
trade investment zones, like advanced technology complexes, are much more 
effective incentives than fiscal or financial incentives as far as strategically 
investment inducement is concerned (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 27). 
 
As pointed out already, many different types of investment incentives are offered by 
countries worldwide in order to stimulate foreign investment in their countries.  
Investment incentives have close connections to many of the investment inducing 
countries' objectives, such as export promotion, job creation, technology transfer and 
revolution.  UNCTAD stated that export related incentives have been the most effect 
incentives.  Korea's Export Free Zone has been receiving much attention as 
successful example of foreign investment inducement even after the financial crisis 
that hit the country in November 1997 and is backing up these study conclusions. 
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Although many countries are offering varying types of incentive packages, it has been 
pointed out that much care is needed in designing and operation if those incentives are 
to effectively achieve small goals that they set out to do in the first place.  When 
incentives are offered to attract specific foreign investment, the incentives must be 
designed to fit the special characteristics of the investment.  And, when incentives 
are offered at different levels of governments, coordination is important.  If 
designing and coordination are not carefully done, investment incentives may bring 
about harmful side effects (Lee/Lee 1998, p. 28). 
 
 
III. WTO AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES 
 
1. Background to Negotiations 
 
The WTO Subsidy Agreement begins with Article 1 (Definition of a Subsidy).  This 
Agreement defines subsidy as when there are benefits ensued from a financial 
contribution by a government or any form of income or price support in the sense of 
Article 16 of GATT 1994 (Ahn and Yoo, p. 15, Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 17). 
 
USA and EC each took different positions in establishing the legal concepts of 
subsidy.  On one hand, the US, in their attempt to expand the concept of subsidies, 
defined subsidy as all activities that benefits on specific industries.  On the other 
hand, the EC argued that subsidies exist only when there is a cost to government (Yoo, 
p. 7). 
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As a result of negotiations to bring these difference together, the WTO Subsidy 
Agreement stipulate "a financial contribution by a government" and "a benefity 
thereby conferred" as the conditions for justifying subsidy.  This means subsidies 
shall be seen as any benefits that befall a private company as a result of government 
measures even though there is no cost incurred to the government in doing this.  This 
in essence means acceptance of US claims that a subsidy consists of "benefits to the 
recipient."  Further, by noting that a financial contribution by a government may take 
place indirectly through a private organization, the Agreement included indirect 
subsidies, claimed by the US, into the scope of a subsidy (Ahn and Yoo, p. 15). 
 
The definition of a subsidy, especially "a financial contribution by a government", 
ended up being very complex as a result of negotiations between US and EC.  
Therefore, more arguments may arise out of different interpretation of "a financial 
contribution by a government" than from "benefits" (Ahn and Yoo, p. 15; Yoo, p. 7). 
 
 
2. Definition of a Subsidy 
 
Subsidies that come under regulatory control are those cases in which benefits are 
conferred through a financial contribution by a government in relation to trading of 
goods and in which such benefits are conferred upon a recipient with specific 
characteristics. 
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Article 1 
 
Definition of a Subsidy 
 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be 
deemed to exist if: 
 
(a)(1)  There is a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in 
this Agreement as “government”), i.e. where: 
 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of 
funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct 
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax 
credits)1; 
 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than 
general infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding 
mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out 
one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) 
above which would normally be vested in the government and 
the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally 
followed by governments; 
 
or 
 
(a)(2)  there is any form of income or price support in the sense of 
Article XVI of GATT 1994; 
 
and 
 
(b)     a benefit is thereby conferred. 
 
1.2 A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to 
the provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the provisions of 
Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 2. 
 
 
                                                 
1 In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the 
provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from 
duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of 
such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a 
subsidy. 
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In order to review the objectives of financial contribution by a government or a public 
body, it must first be understood that the concept of "government" provided for in this 
Agreement is a wide range concept that includes not only public bodies but also 
private bodies controlled by the government.  Further, public bodies include 
government bodies in which the government may take direct or indirect participation 
and special bodies that are under government control or have the right to act with 
public authority.  Here, the government receives power of authority on subsidy 
grants from the government or is granted part of the fund, thereby, including private 
bodies whose activities are not very different from that of government practices.  
Government’s financial contribution refers to liability of the public accounting.  
Liability in public accounting occurs when  funds are transferred to the private 
sector through such medium as gratuitous support, waiving the debts, loans, and share 
participation;  when funds are potentially transferred to the private sector via loan 
guarantees;  when it take over private sector’s debts;  when government gives up 
tax revenues by giving tax deductions; 	 when government provides the private 
sector with goods or services other than SOCs; or 
 when government purchases 
goods from the private sector.  However, government’s participation in the private 
sector activities without any liability to the government’s public accounting is not 
considered as subsidy (Ahn and Yoo, p. 18; Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 18; Yoo, 
pp. 9-10). 
 
Gratuitous support, which falls under direct transfer of funds, is different from loans 
or share participation in that government does not expect anything back in return for 
the funds provided.  And, potential transfer of funds or liability burdens include 
various insurances provided by the government.  Direct taxes given up by the 
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government include tax exemption, drawbacks, deferred payment in the form of tax 
reduction, earnings deduction, special depreciation, and guaranteed fund system.  
While indirect taxes, exemption of value added tax, consumption tax, accumulated 
indirect tax, drawbacks, and deferments and reduction of customs duties are 
considered as taxes forfeited by the government.  However, according to Article 16 
of GATT Agreement and to Annex to this Agreement, customs duties or internal taxes 
assessed on domestic consumption gods are exempted for export goods when customs 
duties or internal taxes refunded on the condition that the amount of refund not exceed 
taxes paid are not seen as subsidies (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 19). 
 
Further in relation to specificity of subsidy grants, SOCs, as long as no actual 
restrictions are placed on the recipients, are not seen as subsidies.  If SOCs were to 
be monopolized by a specific company or industry, or if the government provides 
SOCs to a company based on a decision that is not deemed to be neutral or objective, 
such actions set off countervailing measures from the country which the goods in 
question are imported.  In addition, price support in Article 16 of the GATT 1994 
refers to various financial supports provided by the government to the companies in 
order to stabilize the prices of goods produced by the companies and a subsidy must 
go through the specificity test stipulated in Article 2 of this Agreement if it is to be 
classified as countervailing.  Government’s double grain price system or export price 
support systems are considered as price supports.  According to the definition of a 
subsidy, financial contribution, an essential condition in defining subsidy, may come 
into being without any cost to the government.  If a burden occurs to the account of a 
private body that receives orders from the government, it shall be seen as a cost to the 
government even though no direct cost has been incurred to the government.  That is 
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the necessary conditions for a subsidy as defined is not met just by the government 
bringing some financial burden to the public account, but applies equally to various 
activities that have the same effect (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 19). 
 
However, for government’s special measures to the private sector to be defined as a 
subsidy, condition of benefits to the beneficiary must be satisfied at the same time 
along with a financial contribution by a government.  Benefits to the recipient is 
decided by Article 14 of this Agreement on Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in 
Terms of the Benefit to the Recipients.  Of the countries that have assessed 
countervailing duties prior to this, that is US, Canada, EU, and Australia, all except 
the US judged the existence of subsidy as “cost to the government” concept.  But in 
this Agreement, “benefit to the recipient” concept is newly introduced, thereby, 
establishing a new definition of a subsidy.  That is US’s position was upheld in the 
Uruguay Rounds.  In Canada, EU and Australia, the existence and size of a subsidy 
were based on borrowing rate and lending rate which meant that a burden had to take 
place in the government’s public accounting for a subsidy to exist.  Therefore, the 
object of countervailing duties was decided by cost to the government concept and not 
benefit to the recipient (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 20). 
 
On the other hand, US had differed from GATT 1947 provisions and used benefits to 
the recipient concept in judging subsidies so that a subsidy was seen to exist if a 
recipient receives benefits from special measures taken by the government even if 
there was no direct cost to the government.  In this case, “benefit” refers to the 
amount that exceeds the cost to be paid when recipient uses alternative methods in the 
market and this excessive amount becomes the object of countervailing duties.  
 20
Therefore, when applying benefits to the recipient concept, subsidy exists if a 
company benefits from government’s preferential treatment even in the absence of 
any burden to the government’s public accounting (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 
21). 
 
Benefits to the recipient appear in different forms depending on the government’s 
method of financial contribution.  That is,  
 
(A) The whole amount of grants are benefits to the recipient.  Whereas in mitigation 
of debts, the principal and interests to be paid at the time of mitigation become the 
benefits.  In cases of loans, the difference between amount paid by the recipient 
company on government loans and the amount paid on the loan it can actually procure 
in the market becomes the benefit.  Differences arise in benefits that a company 
receives in obtaining government loans depending on creditworthiness of the 
companies and on the lending institutions. 
 
(B) If the equity infusion by the government is not outside the sphere of customary 
investment practices of the private investment, it is seen to have produced no benefits.  
That is, if there is no difference between the price of shares purchased by the 
government directly from the company and the market price of the shares purchased 
by general investors from the company, no benefits have been produced.  In this 
instance, equity infusion by government in an unequity-worthy firm, that is a firm on 
such bad financial grounds that no prices are formed in the market for its shares, the 
benefits to the company are decided based on the difference between that company’s 
rate of return on investment and rate of return shortfall (RORS) for a firm of the same 
 21
industry (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 21). 
 
(C) In loan guarantees, the difference between amount to be paid by the company that 
received government loan guarantee at the time of loan and the amount that it would 
have to pay without the government loan guarantee is seen as benefits to the company. 
 
(D) The benefit produced from government’s forfeiting of tax revenues is the 
difference between the taxes that a company has to pay in the absence of special taxes 
and taxes that it has to pay when special taxes do exist.  Exemption of direct taxes, 
drawbacks, and reduction/exemption of taxes, earnings deduction, special 
depreciation, and preparation funds systems which are all forms of deferred payments, 
the benefits to the recipient are the amount of reduction/exemption that results from 
the tax system in question.  The same is also true for exemption of indirect taxes, 
drawbacks, and deferments.  However, only excess reduction/exemption and excess 
drawbacks are seen as benefits to the recipient for indirect taxes in which this 
Agreement sets special stipulations as provided for in “Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies). 
 
(E) Benefits resulting from provision of goods or services originating from the 
government, or purchasing of goods by the government are also judged along with 
commercial considerations.  Benefit result when government gives preferential 
treatment in providing goods or services to certain firms within its area of jurisdiction 
or if it purchases goods produced by these companies at high prices. 
 
Also, as provided for in the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies of this Agreement, 
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the government may provide production elements (domestics goods or import goods) 
at more advantageous conditions than production of domestic goods for 
manufacturing of export goods, but if the conditions provided for production of export 
goods are better than those commercially viable in the international market, then the 
problems concerning subsidy grants arise. 
 
(F) Benefits from earnings support occurs if compensations that a firm must normally 
pay to workers are taken care of the government through financial supports.  
However, if the government’s earnings support is only an additional profit to workers 
and is not related to firm’s responsibilities, then benefits are not produced (Korea 
Chamber of Commerce, p. 22). 
 
(G) In cases of price supports, government’s cost in stabilizing specific firms or 
specific industries can be seen as providing benefits to firms, but various forms of 
price stability systems in which existences of subsidies are difficult to decide must be 
judged case by case depending on individual circumstances (Korea Chamber of 
Commerce, p. 23). 
 
 
IV. SPECIFICITY IN GRANTING SUBSIDIES 
 
In granting subsidies, the existence or non-existence of specificity, that is advance 
restrictive problems like whether the government implements any special measures to 
restrict the range of benefit in payment of subsidies and post problems that present 
more practical issues like whether the firms made fair use of such measures, or 
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accessibility must be considered.  If the specificity of a subsidy brought about 
disadvantageous effects to economic profits of other contracting countries, 
countervailing measures may be implement afterwards. 
 
Therefore, in vise versa, no specificity in a subsidy means that even if other 
contracting countries are disadvantageously affected due to the granting of the subsidy, 
no counter measures, whether it be bilateral or multilateral, may be taken.  Article 2 
of WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provides for 
specificity as follows (Ahn and Yoo, p. 29; http://www.lgeri.com; Yoo, p. 19; Korea 
Chamber of Commerce, p. 27). 
 
Article 2 
 
Specificity 
 
2.1 In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in 
paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an enterprise or industry or 
group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as 
“certain enterprises”) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, 
the following principles shall apply: 
 
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the 
granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to 
certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific. 
 
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the 
granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions2 
governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity 
shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such 
criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to.  The criteria or 
conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other 
official document, so as to be capable of verification. 
 
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from 
the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), 
there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, 
                                                 
2 Objective criteria or conditions, as used herein, mean criteria or conditions which are neutral, which 
do not favour certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in 
application, such as number of employees or size of enterprise. 
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other factors may be considered.  Such factors are: use of a subsidy 
programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant 
use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large 
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which 
discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision 
to grant a subsidy.3  In applying this subparagraph, account shall be 
taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time 
during which the subsidy programme has been in operation. 
 
2.2 A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located 
within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the 
granting authority shall be specific.  It is understood that the setting or 
change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government 
entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the 
purposes of this Agreement. 
 
2.3 Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be 
deemed to be specific. 
 
2.4 Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this 
Article shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence. 
 
Paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Article 2 contains advance limits on access.  It stipulates 
that specificity is deemed to exist if the granting authority or concerned regulations 
clearly limit granting of the subsidy to certain enterprises or industries within the 
jurisdiction of authority, or enterprise or industry counties (referred to as certain 
enterprises in this Agreement) pursuant to regulations or actual practice.  “Certain 
enterprises” here does not refer to “all enterprises” with the area of jurisdiction but 
only includes certain number of enterprises or industries.  Therefore, if a subsidy is 
to be granted to all enterprises within a area of jurisdiction, no problem of specificity 
arises.  The other hand is where granting authorities or concerned regulations clearly 
state eligibility and amount of subsidy in an act, regulation, or official document 
based on objective and neutral criteria.  And if meeting these conditions 
automatically means becoming a recipient, then no specificity exists (Ahn and Yoo, p. 
                                                 
3 In this regard, in particular, information on the frequency with which applications for a subsidy are 
refused or approved and the reasons for such decisions shall be considered. 
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31; Yoo, p. 21; Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 28). 
 
If recipients of subsidies are limited to certain number of specific enterprises, 
“specificity” comes into being.  But no objective criteria using data like industry 
classification system has yet been established on whether specificity is created if the 
industry or industrial zone is somewhat limited.  Generally, all factors that may 
affect specificity are simultaneously considered with comprehensive, integrated 
decisions reached.  However, International Trade Commission of the US, the leading 
country on the issue of specificity, is of the opinion that specificity is not seen to rise 
if recipients are not designated according to industries but on objective and neutral 
criteria (e.g. high-tech industries or small and medium enterprises).  But specificity 
is seen to come into being even for subsidies meant for small and medium enterprises 
if it it limited to certain small and medium industries (Yoo, p. 21; Korea Chamber of 
Commerce, p. 29). 
 
In relation to this, specificity is seen to exist if the government offers tax supports to 
specific enterprises or industries or if it implements the system selectively with 
limited range of enterprises as recipients in mind in reality, but no specificity exists if 
the system is applied equally to all enterprises and manufacturers alike. 
 
However, USITC argues that specificity again comes into being if the government 
gives additional tax deductions on specific goods only.  Decisions on tax rates or 
changes to tax rates generally applied by the government of the jurisdictional area 
shall carry no specificity (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 29). 
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Still, because price or earnings supports are aimed at specific enterprises (districts) or 
industries (districts), it contains characteristics of specificity from the beginning and 
“price and earnings stabilizing policies”, a part of macro-economy, generally does not 
contain specificity and therefore does not apply to price and earnings supports 
provided for in this Agreement (Yoo, p. 21). 
 
Further, supporting an individual enterprise or industry in a situation where many 
subsidy granting systems are in mutually concerned relationships, the relationships 
among those systems must also be reviewed before deciding whether specificity exists 
or not.  However, in cases of social infrastructures, specificity does not exist unless 
the government limits enterprises from launching businesses in SOC construction 
areas.  This is because SOC facilities do not have specificity if they can be used by 
all enterprises involved in business in the SOC area and not just by few specific 
enterprises or industries.  Care should be taken here because specificity does not 
exist if accessibility to SOC is limited by it location and special characteristics and 
not by government measures (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 30). 
 
Specificity is deemed to exist even in cases where subsidy is granted with no limits if 
subsidy after being granted is used mostly by some enterprises or industries or if 
government makes selective choices of recipients.  Regulations on post granting and 
actual accessibility of subsidies are briefed in paragraph 1(a) of Article 2 of this 
Agreement.  Specificity issues can arise afterwards when only limited number of few 
enterprises make use of the subsidy, when subsidizes end up being used by only few 
enterprises, when subsidies are granted in unequal proportions to only a few 
enterprises, or when granting authority makes selective decisions in granting subsidies.  
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In these cases, the diversity of economic activities of the granting authority and the 
enterprises or industries receiving the subsidies must all be taken into consideration in 
deciding the existence or non-existence of specificity.  The US call this the Four-
Prong Test and sees specificity as existing if any one or more of these conditions are 
satisfied.  Specificity can be said to be absent only when none of these are met (e.g. 
countervailing duty assessment on Software Lumber and Management discussed at 
US/Canada FTA subcommittee meeting in 1994). 
 
At this point, in relation to problems of judging specificity, we need to review the 
position taken by the US, the country that internationally assesses the most 
countervailing measures in number and is leading the world in this area. 
 
The US (Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce) considered both the 
pre- limitation issues and post- accessibility issues at the same time and came up with 
the following 3 basic principles on which specificity issues are to be judged.  First, 
does a foreign government limit the accessibility to the system?  Second, is the 
system proportionate, or does there exist a major user?  Third, has the government 
taken any selective actions in the granting procedure? (Korea Chamber of Commerce, 
p. 30-31). 
 
Specificity involving specific geographical regions is dealt with in paragraph 2.2 of 
Article 2 of the Agreement.  According to paragraph 2.2, specificity exists if a 
granting authority provides subsidy to a certain enterprise located within a designated 
geographical region within its jurisdiction, or vise versa.  A subsidy that is accessible 
to all enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the 
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jurisdiction of the granting authority is seen to be non-specific.  That is, no 
specificity is seen to exist if the central government designated a specific area and 
gives all enterprises within that geographical region the equal opportunity to access 
the subsidy.  If the aforementioned interpretation is correct, then the permissible 
subsidy for underdeveloped regions mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 8 has no 
special significance.  That is, paragraph 2 of Article 2 allows policies aimed at 
regional development to be fully utilized. 
 
Therefore, provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 2 argued for by Canada at the time is 
expected to set off a major attacks once the WTO is launched.  Looking at it now, 
this provision can be interpreted as there being no specificity if the central 
government chooses a designated geographical region within its jurisdiction and grant 
subsidies to all enterprises in the area.  That is, if the government can compensate for 
the costs incurred to enterprises for launching businesses in disadvantageous site 
locations in a fair and undiscriminating way, it cannot become the object of 
countervailing measures (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 31). 
 
At the same time, on the other hand, the prohibited subsidy stipulated in Article 3 of 
the Agreement may become the target of countervailing measures by countries 
sharing common understanding because prohibited subsidies are specific without any 
exceptions (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 32). 
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V. DIFFERENT TYPES OF SUBSIDIES AND THEIR SPECIAL           
CHARACTERS 
 
1. Prohibited Subsidy 
 
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures chose the traffic 
light approach and divided subsidies into 3 categories: prohibited subsidies, 
actionable subsidies, and non-actionable subsidies. 
 
Prohibited subsidies cannot be used at source, while actionable subsidies may do so 
on the condition that it is subject to countervailing if it adversely affects other 
contracting countries.  And, non-actionable subsidies may be used without being too 
tied down to counter measures.  Further, remedy procedures for are varied according 
to subsidy types, thereby clarifying the settlement of disputes via multilateral medium 
like the WTO (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 43; Yoo, p. 28). 
 
Although there were difficulties in the process, in the final WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, prohibited subsidies were restricted to export 
subsidies and import transfer subsidies, which have trade distortion effect.  
Introduction of subsidies exceeding in quantity or certain rates over sales are 
stipulated as countervailing subsidies (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 43). 
 
 
Article 3 
 
Prohibition 
 
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be 
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prohibited: 
 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4, whether solely or as one of 
several other conditions, upon export performance, including those 
illustrated in Annex I5; 
 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
 
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred 
to in paragraph 1. 
 
 
 
(B) Interpretation 
 
Prohibited subsidies are divided into export subsidies and import transfer subsidies.  
Export subsidies refer to subsidies granted upon export performance in law or in fact 
and include those listed in the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies.  Although 
payment of export subsidies have nothing to do with export performance in law, it 
does include expected exports, actual exports or earnings resulting from export 
subsidies.  Here, export performance means basically activities based on exports but 
is not of concept that it includes all activities that have even little to do with exports.  
That is, just the fact tat subsidies are granted to all exporting enterprises does not 
make it an export subsidy.  Above all else, subsidies based on export performance or 
granted on the condition of carrying out exports responsibilities are considered to be 
export subsidies. 
 
                                                 
4 This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been 
made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or 
export earnings.  The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that 
reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision. 
 
5 Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this 
or any other provision of this Agreement. 
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In this case, export responsibility is interpreted to include not only the items clearly 
stipulated but all relations connected to export responsibilities in fact.  However, a 
system that applies equally to exports and domestic goods alike cannot be said to 
belong to export performance provisions.  Therefore, export subsidy is not 
established simply when the size of the export subsidy is proportional to actual export 
size, but when a subsidy is granted under export activities as pre-conditions, then they 
all become export subsidies. 
 
Basically, export subsidy puts forward as examples various forms of financial 
contributions which the 12 important types listed in Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies may take. 
 
However, this List does not list all prohibited export subsidies and therefore inserts 
general conditions under the term “export performance” in paragraph 9(a) of Article 
3.1 on prohibition on export subsidies (Ahn and Yoo, p. 40; Korea Chamber of 
Commerce, p. 44; Yoo, p. 29). 
 
The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies gives as examples 12 types of financial 
contributions that a government may make to exporting enterprises.  That is, they are 
direct subsidies granted to enterprises or industries according to export performance.  
In relation to this, the US includes cases in which subsidy is directly granted 
depending on export performance and where benefits are produced.  Direct subsidy 
refers to direct transfer of funds that directly benefit enterprises or general 
government measures like tax reduction/exemption.  On the other hand, giving 
incentives on subsidy grants to financial institutions by applying rediscounted rates in 
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stages when granting funds in specific areas or lowering prices of goods by the 
government via expansion of supply of certain goods to benefit enterprise are seen as 
indirect subsidies. 
 
Currency retention schemes, export encouragement awards paid as bonuses on 
exports and some practices similar to these belong to the category of export subsidies.  
That is, allowing export enterprises to retain foreign currency for its export purposes 
or in order to sell to a third party country or where such systems are encouraged are 
considered as export subsidies that apply foreign exchange rate to export enterprises 
are considered to be an export subsidy except where it is operated under the IMF 
Agreement. 
 
If the government provides transport and transportation costs under favorable 
conditions when shipping export goods rather than domestic goods, then this is seen 
as export subsidy.  Further, if the government orders a transporting enterprise tat is 
commissioned by the government to apply lower transport costs to export goods than 
for domestic consumption goods, this becomes a preferential measure for exports 
although no burden has been created in the government’s public accounts.  However, 
if the differences in the transport costs are due to existing customary practices among 
enterprises, or when they are commercially explainable, they are not considered as 
export subsidies. 
 
When the government directly or indirectly provides import goods, domestic goods 
and service that go into producing export goods at more advantageous conditions than 
for production of domestic consumption goods, then they are seen as export subsidies.  
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That is, the government must not provide raw materials or services under better 
conditions for production of export goods that it would for production of goods to be 
domestically consumed.  However, when government provides raw materials that are 
not under import control, if these raw materials, whether it be import or domestic 
goods, are supplied for export production at a higher price than at world market prices, 
this shall not be seen as export subsidy.  But cases like these will not occur in a 
country that does not regulate imports.  If raw materials under import control are 
provided to exporting enterprises at more advantageous conditions than to producers 
of domestic consumption goods even though that price may still be higher than world 
market prices, it then becomes an export subsidy.  It also is seen as an export subsidy 
if direct burden is brought to the government’s public accounts. 
 
Direct taxes or social security costs that enterprises have to pay but are exempted, 
given drawbacks, or deferred in partial or whole for export cases are seen as export 
subsidies.  However, according to footnote 57 of the Agreement, industrial or 
commercial enterprise mentioned in that paragraph can be seen to mean general 
enterprises. 
 
When calculating tax standards for direct taxes, special deductions allowed in relation 
to exports rather than assessing tem for production of domestic consumption goods 
are seen as export subsidies. 
 
Following conditions must be met in order for exemption or drawbacks of indirect 
taxes that are assessed in the final stages of goods production or distribution to be 
considered as export subsidies.  If the exemption or drawback of indirect taxes on 
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export goods exceed the amount of indirect taxed assessed on domestic consumption 
goods, then such exemptions and drawbacks are seen as establishing export subsidies.  
Exemption or drawbacks of indirect taxes assessed in the final stages of production 
are not export subsidies unless they are excess exemptions or excess drawbacks. 
 
Goods and services such as machines, labor, materials, energy, oil are broad range of 
production elements that are used for production of export goods that exceed the 
exemption, refunds, or deferments of accumulated indirect taxes that are assessed in 
the middle stages of goods production.  However, should exemption, refund, or 
deferment of all accumulated indirect taxes be possible, these shall not be seen as 
export subsidies unless they are excess exemptions, excess refunds, or excess 
deferments.  In this case, the object of exemption, refund or deferment are not the 
wide range of production elements like machines and labor listed above but “input 
elements used up in the production process” are limited to input elements in 
materialized form, energy, fuel and oil consumed during production, and catalysts.  
The reason for narrowing down the list of element that can be exempted, refunded or 
deferred was to curtail exceptions of export subsidies. 
 
If inputs that are consumed in the production of export goods are assessed on imports 
but are refunded in excess, then they are seen to form export subsidies.  However, in 
cases where an enterprise does not manufacture and export goods made with imported 
raw materials but using alternative domestic raw materials instead, the import 
materials are seen to have been used in the manufacturing of export goods and 
customs duties and import assessments may be reduced if the import of those raw 
materials and counter exports took place in a reasonable period not lasting longer than 
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2 years.  Guidelines on such substitution drawback system are separately provided 
for in Annex III to this Agreement. 
 
Even information deemed inappropriate for preservation of long-term operation costs 
or losses can become export subsidies if export insurance rates or guarantee rates are 
set low enough.  The US Department of Commerce deems export subsidies as 
existing if 5 years’ export insurance rates are inappropriate for preservation of long-
term operational costs or losses and sees the difference between the insurance 
premium that the firm pays and the benefit that it receives as the benefits from such 
export subsidy. 
 
Export subsidies come into being in the following cases: if the government grants 
export credits at lower interest rates than procurement costs; if it gives partial or 
whole reduction of funds procurement costs to exporting firms; or if the government 
on behalf of the financial institution pays in part or whole the costs that must be borne 
in order to procure funds to be used in export credits.  That is, if the government 
pays part of all of interests or costs that a firm must pay in being granted export 
credits or if the government pays part or whole of handling institution’s costs in order 
to give incentive to the financial institution that deals with export credits, then it both 
cases export subsidies have come into existence.  However, this will not hold true for 
signatory countries to OECD Guidelines on Export Credits and OECD Multilateral 
Shipping Agreement, Aircraft Agreement, Nuclear Plant Agreement as long as export 
credits are granted in accordance with these agreements. 
 
The 11 lists presented as examples above were decided upon numerous discussion at 
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GATT focused on past practices of certain specific countries and are very clear in 
content.  However, other export subsidies not clearly stated in these lists are very 
diverse in content and vague so that its conditions can also only be very general.  
Therefore, paragraph 12, covering all other export subsidies, stipulates that cost to the 
government and price difference stipulated in paragraph 4 of Article 16 of GATT 1994 
shall set the conditions for export subsidies.  However, in light of the definition of 
subsidy in Article 1 of this Agreement, cost to the government is not absolutely 
necessary for export subsidy to come into being and cost to the accounts of private 
bodies that have been commissioned, entrusted, or controlled by the government may 
still indicate export subsidies. 
 
Import transfer subsidies was previously classified as domestic subsidies in the Tokyo 
Round of Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Negotiation, but is classified as 
prohibited subsidy in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
Import transfer subsidy is a unique or one of many important conditions that is 
granted when domestic goods are used in place of export goods.  That is, import 
transfer subsidy comes into being if subsidy is granted in cases where use of 
domestics goods is imposed, use of domestic goods is promoted, or import transfer is 
put in as a condition.  This stipulation was adopted at the insistence of the US and 
Japan, but there is no precedence of this stipulation being implemented so far so that it 
makes it difficult to establish the range of application.  The only clear example is in 
the case of trade materials where it is compared to import goods and preferential 
treatments are given to domestic goods.  Here, it can be said that characteristics of 
prohibitive subsidy exists (Ahn and Yoo, p. 41-48; Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 
45-49; Yoo, p. 31-46). 
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2. Actionable Subsidy 
 
(A) WTO member countries must not bring about adverse effects to profits of other 
members countries in the process of satisfying the definition and specificity of 
subsidies.  If adverse effects are brought to a member country as a result of granting 
subsidies that are specific in character, countervailing measures may be taken through 
multilateral or bilateral channels at WTO.  In this sense on adverse effects to other 
member countries, this Agreement is consistent with the Tokyo Rounds.  First, 
subsidies with specificity are consistent with concepts in paragraph 3 of Article 8 of 
other countries’ Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  Second, 
subsidies with specificity must not harm the domestic industries of other member 
countries.  Subsidies may become the target of countervailing measures if the price 
of subsidy granted goods falls, is exported in masses, and reduces the profit rates of 
other member country’s domestic industries or enterprises.  Third, if the 
competitiveness of goods in question is enhanced through granting of subsidy on 
customs duty conceded goods, then it bring practical harm to the benefits of other 
member countries following the WTO customs concessions.  Therefore, such 
government measures must be prevented.  Fourth, subsidies that seriously prejudice 
other member country’s profits must be watched for in advanced and prevented. 
 
Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures state the 
following provisions regarding adverse effects of subsidies (Korea Chamber of 
Commerce, p. 49-50). 
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Article 5 
 
Adverse Effects 
 
No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy 
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the 
interests of other Members, i.e.: 
 
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another member6; 
 
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly 
to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of 
concessions bound under Article II of GATT 19947; 
 
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.8 
 
 
This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as 
provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
  
 
 
(B) Article 6 
 
In order for countervailing measures of countries with common understanding 
following a granting of subsidy by a member country, a serious prejudice must have 
occurred in the country at question.  Therefore, Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures stipulates in detail, the contents of which are 
as follows. 
 
Article 6 
 
Serious Prejudice 
 
                                                 
6 The term “injury to the domestic industry” is used here in the same sense as it is used in Part V. 
 
7 The term “nullification or impairment” is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in 
the relevant provisions of GATT 1994, and the existence of such nullification or impairment shall be 
established in accordance with the practice of application of these provisions. 
 
8 The term “serious prejudice to the interests of another Member” is used in this Agreement in the 
same sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and includes threat of serious 
prejudice. 
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6.1 Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 
shall be deemed to exist in the case of: 
 
(a) the total ad valorem subsidization9 of a product exceeding 5 per 
cent10; 
 
(b) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; 
 
(c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other 
than one-time measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be 
repeated for that enterprise and which are given merely to provide time 
for the development of long-term solutions and to avoid acute social 
problems; 
 
direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, 
and grants to cover debt repayment.11 
 
6.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, serious 
prejudice shall not be found if the subsidizing Member demonstrates 
that the subsidy in question has not resulted in any of the effects 
enumerated in paragraph 3. 
 
6.3 Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 
may arise in any case where one of several of the following apply: 
 
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like 
product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; 
 
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like 
product of another Member from a third country market; 
 
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the 
subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of 
another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, 
price depression or lost sales in the same market; 
 
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of 
the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or 
commodity12 as compared to the average share it had during the 
                                                 
9 The total ad valorem subsidization shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex IV. 
 
10 Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the threshold in 
this subparagraph does not apply to civil aircraft. 
 
11 Members recognize that where royalty-based financing for a civil aircraft programme is not being 
fully repaid due to the level of actual sales falling below the level of forecast sales, this does not in 
itself constitute serious prejudice for the purposes of this subparagraph. 
12 Unless other multilaterally agreed specific rules apply to the trade in the product or commodity in 
question. 
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previous period of three years and this increase follows a consistent 
trend over a period when subsidies have been granted. 
 
6.4 For the purpose of paragraph 3(b), the displacement or 
impeding of exports shall include any case in which, subject to the 
previsions of paragraph 7, it has been demonstrated that there has been 
a change in relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the 
non-subsidized like product (over an appropriately representative 
period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the development of the 
market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances, 
shall be at least one year.)  “Change in relative shares of the market” 
shall include any of the following situations: (a) there is an increase in 
the market share of the subsidized product; (b) the market share of the 
subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the 
absence of the subsidy, it would have declined; (c) the market share of 
the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have 
been the case in the absence of the subsidy. 
 
6.5 For the purpose of paragraph 3(c), price undercutting shall 
include any case in which such price undercutting has been 
demonstrated through a comparison of prices of the subsidized product 
with prices of a non-subsidized like product supplied to the same 
market.  The comparison shall be made at the same level of trade and 
at comparable times, due account being taken of any other factor 
affecting price comparability.  However, if such a direct comparison 
is not possible, the existence of price undercutting may be 
demonstrated on the basis of export unit values. 
 
6.6 Each Member in the market of which serious prejudice is 
alleged to have arisen shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of 
Annex V, make available to the parties to a dispute arising under 
Article 7, and to the panel established pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
Article 7, all relevant information that can be obtained as to the 
changes in market shares of the parties to the dispute as well as 
concerning prices of the products involved. 
 
6.7 Displacement or impediment resulting in serious prejudice 
shall not arise under paragraph 3 where any of the following 
circumstances exist13 during the relevant period: 
 
(a) prohibition or restriction on exports of the like product from the 
complaining Member or on imports from the complaining Member 
into the third country market concerned; 
 
(b) decision by an importing government operating a monopoly of trade 
or state trading in the product concerned to shift, for non-commercial 
                                                 
13 The fact that certain circumstances are referred to in this paragraph does not, in itself, confer upon 
them any legal status in terms of either GATT 1994 or this Agreement.  These circumstances must not 
be isolated, sporadic or otherwise insignificant. 
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reasons, imports from the complaining Member to another country or 
countries; 
 
(c) natural disasters, strikes, transport disruptions or other force majeure 
substantially affecting production, qualities, quantities or prices of the 
product available for export from the complaining Member; 
 
(d) existence of arrangements limiting exports from the complaining 
Member; 
 
(e) voluntary decrease in the availability for export of the product 
concerned from the complaining Member (including, inter alia, a 
situation where firms in the complaining Member have been 
autonomously reallocating exports of this product to new market); 
 
(f) failure to conform to standards and other regulatory requirements in 
the importing country. 
 
6.8 In the absence of circumstances referred to in paragraph 7, 
the existence of serious prejudice should be determined on the basis of 
the information submitted to or obtained by the panel, including 
information submitted in accordance with the provisions of Annex V. 
 
6.9 This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on 
agricultural products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
 
 
(C) Interpretation 
 
Since serious prejudice must occur to the profits of other member countries before 
countervailing measures can be taking against that country, thereby, establishing 
actionable subsidies, the following paragraphs will attempt to interpret Article 6 of the 
Agreement which covers this topic in detail. 
 
The concept of serious prejudice was introduced for the first in the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and is different from other actionable 
subsidies in that it contains advance detection functions which in some sense lend it 
characteristics of prohibitive subsidies.  However, the provision on serious prejudice 
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is to be implemented for 5 years after the Agreement goes into effect and is to be 
reviewed at that point in time.  Further, this provision does not apply to developing 
countries. 
 
Actions may be taken on subsidies that bring about serious prejudice even if it does 
not result in any direct damages to other member countries and the defending country 
must prove that the use of the subsidy at issue did not adversely affect the profits of 
other member countries before it continues to make use of that subsidy (Ahn and Yoo, 
p. 63-66; Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 53; Yoo, p. 51-52). 
 
A specific member country may take action when it discovers that another member 
country used a subsidy in excess over 5% of the rate based on cost to the government, 
granted subsidies in order to preserve business losses to certain industries or 
enterprises, or found out that direct reduction/exemption of debts were being given.  
In this case, in order to continue the use of subsidy in question, the accused country 
must prove that granting of the subsidy import was curtailed in the domestic market, 
curtailed exports of another member country in a third country, price undercutting or 
price suppression took place, or that world market possession rate did not rise.  
When a specific member country adversely affects the profits of another member 
country by granting subsidy, the country that received damages has the burden of 
proof.  But in the case of serious prejudice, the subsidy granting country and not the 
damaged country must prove that no harms were brought to another member country 
and gives it somewhat of a prohibitiveness in nature (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 
54). 
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The conditions that may be used as proofs when bringing action on the question of 
existence of serious prejudice are as follows. 
 
If the total subsidy rate to an enterprise or a specific exceeds 5% of the goods prices 
standards, a serious prejudice is deemed to have taken place.  The calculation of 
subsidy for the sake of convenience is done on “cost to the government” basis and not 
on “benefits to the recipient” basis.  In particular, for the speediness and convenience 
of securing proof, “cost to the government” concept was chosen in the calculation 
which utilizes government’s funds procurement cost instead of the “benefits to the 
recipient” concept because the latter is very complicated, time consuming and costly. 
 
Serious prejudice is seen to taken place if the government grants subsidies in order to 
preserve business losses in certain industries.  For example, if the breeding industry 
directly receives funds from the government in order to make up for the losses of its 
business and to prevent being going out of business, a serious prejudice exists. 
 
If the government grants subsidies in order to preserve the losses to certain specific 
enterprises, the presumptions regarding serious prejudice are eliminated.  Therefore, 
exceptional provisions like this can be said to be used as bankruptcy support systems. 
 
A serious prejudice is deemed to have taken place in situations where the government 
waives the rights to bonds in its possession, provides gratuitous support for repayment 
of debt, and other similar situations where the government gives direct 
reduction/exemptions. 
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As discussed above, if a member country recognizes the four conditions that indicate 
the presence of serious prejudice and requests negotiations, the subsidy granting 
country must prove to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures that it did not adversely affect the profits of another member country in 
granting the subsidy at issue.  In doing this, the subsidy granting country must use 
one or more of the following provisions in proving their innocence. 
 
First, the subsidy granting country must prove that granting of the subsidy did not 
impede or replace the import of like goods of foreign production in the domestic 
market. 
 
Second, the subsidy granting country must prove that granting of the subsidy did not 
impede or replace the import of other member countries’ goods in a third country 
market.  In particular, it must be proven using relative market information like trends 
and changes in the market for over a year for related goods that clearly show that 
market possession rate of the goods that received the subsidy did increase, did not 
decrease in a situation where it should have gone down, or did not decrease at a 
slower rate than would have in the absence of the subsidy. 
 
To gather the necessary information in this process, the subsidy granting country may 
request statistical information from third country governments via questionnaires, or 
may request cooperation and support from third countries even in cases where it is 
taking on market analysis of its own accord.   
 
Third, the subsidy granting country must prove using data on comparisons between 
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their good with the goods of like goods from other countries, as well as the price of 
subsidized like products.  And, in doing price comparisons, it must properly take 
into consideration overall factors and may use export value when there are no 
appropriate objects for comparison. 
 
Fourth, the subsidy granting country must prove that if the market possession rate of 
the good in question had increase in the 3 years immediately prior that such increase 
was not a continuous trend throughout the period in which the subsidy was granted. 
 
However, as in following situations where exports are distorted due to factors other 
than the subsidy, the subsidy granting country need not prove that granting the 
subsidy did not bring about serious prejudice to another member country to the 
Committee. 
 
First, restriction are placed on like goods exported from the country that initiated the 
action or banned all together, or when restrictions or prohibitions are places on the 
like goods from the action initiated country in the process of those goods being 
exported to a third country. 
 
Second, when a monopolizing or national trade system maintaining country decides to 
change its line of imports from the action initiated country for non-commercial 
reasons. 
 
Third, force maguire, such as natural disasters, labor disputes, or paralysis of 
transportation system, in the action initiated country effects the production, quality, 
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quantity, or price of the exported goods/ 
 
Fourth, when the action initiating country implements export restricting agreements. 
 
Fifth, when the action initiating country voluntarily reduces its export for reasons 
such launching of new products. 
 
Sixth, when various standards and conditions set by the action initiating country are 
not met. 
 
In order to make fast and accurate judgment on serious prejudices, Annex V 
(Procedures for developing information concerning serious prejudice) contains 
separate provisions on information developing procedures (Korea Chamber of 
Commerce, p. 54-57). 
 
 
3. Non-Actionable Subsidy 
 
Article 8 
 
Non-actionable subsidy, a concept that was officially introduced for the first time in 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, is limited to the results 
of Uruguay Rounds, research and development subsidies, regional development 
subsidies, and environment subsidies. 
 
 47
Article 8 of the Agreement has the provisions on non-actionable subsidy which should 
first be looked at before going any farther. 
 
Article 8 
 
Identification of Non-Actionable Subsidies 
 
8.1 The following subsidies shall be considered as non-
actionable14: 
 
(a) subsidies which are not specific within the meaning of Article 2; 
 
(b) subsidies which are specific within the meaning of Article 2 but 
which meet all of the conditions provided for in paragraph 2(a), 2(b) or 
2(c) below. 
 
8.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the 
following subsidies shall be non-actionable: 
 
(a) assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher 
education or research establishments on a contract basis with firms if;15, 
16, 17 
 
the assistance covers18 not more than 75 percent of the costs of 
industrial research19 or 50 per cent of the costs of pre-competitive 
                                                 
14 It is recognized that government assistance for various purposes is widely provided by Members 
and that the mere fact that such assistance may not qualify for non-actionable treatment under the 
provisions of this Article does not in itself restrict the ability of Members to provide such assistance. 
 
15 Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the provisions 
of this subparagraph do not apply to that product. 
 
16 Not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provided for in Article 24 (referred to in this Agreement as 
“the Committee”) shall review the operation of the provisions of subparagraph 2(a) with a view to 
making all necessary modifications to improve the operation of these provisions.  In its consideration 
of possible modifications, the Committee shall carefully review the definitions of the categories set 
forth in this subparagraph in the light of the experience of Members in the operation of research 
programmes and the work in other relevant international institutions. 
 
17 The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to fundamental research activities independently 
conducted by higher education or research establishments.  The term “fundamental research” means 
an enlargement of general scientific and technical knowledge not linked to industrial or commercial 
objectives. 
 
18 The allowable levels of non-actionable assistance referred to in this subparagraph shall be 
established by reference to the total eligible costs incurred over the duration of an individual project. 
 
19 The term “industrial research” means planed search or critical investigation aimed at discovery of 
new knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in developing new products, 
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development activity20, 21; 
 
and provided that such assistance is limited exclusively to: 
 
(i) costs of personnel (researchers, technicians and other 
supporting staff employed exclusively in the research activity); 
 
(ii) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used 
exclusively and permanently (except when disposed of on a 
commercial basis) for the research activity; 
 
(iii) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively 
for the research activity, including bought-in research, technical 
knowledge, patents, etc.; 
 
(iv) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the 
research activity; 
 
(v) other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and 
the like), incurred directly as a result of the research activity. 
 
(b) assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a Member 
given pursuant to a general framework of regional development22 and 
non-specific (within the meaning of Article 2) within eligible regions 
provided that: 
 
(i) each disadvantaged region must be a clearly designated 
contiguous geographical area with a definable economic and 
administrative identity; 
 
(ii) the region is considered as disadvantaged on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                            
processes or services, or in bringing about a significant improvement to existing products, processes or 
services. 
 
20 The term “pre-competitive development activity” means the translation of industrial research 
findings into a plan, blueprint or design for new, modified or improved products, processes or services 
whether intended for sale or use, including the creation of a first prototype which would not be capable 
of commercial use.  It may further include the conceptual formulation and design of products, 
processes or services alternatives and initial demonstration or pilot projects, provided that these same 
projects cannot be converted or used for industrial application or commercial exploitation.  It does not 
include routine or periodic alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, 
services, and other on-going operations even though those alterations may represent improvements. 
 
21 In the case of programmes which span industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, 
the allowable level of non-actionable assistance shall not exceed the simple average of the allowable of 
non-actionable assistance applicable to the above two categories, calculated on the basis of all eligible 
costs as set forth in items (i) to (v) of this subparagraph. 
22 A “general framework of regional development” means that regional subsidy programmes are part 
of an internally consistent and generally applicable regional development policy and that regional 
development subsidies are not granted in isolated geographical points having no, or virtually no, 
influence on the development of a region. 
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neutral and objective criteria23, indicating that the region’s difficulties 
arise out of more than temporary circumstances; such criteria must be 
clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as 
to be capable of verification; 
 
(iii) the criteria shall include a measurement of economic 
development which shall be based on at least one of the following 
factors: 
 
one of either income per capita or household income per capita, or 
GDP per capita, which must not be above 85 per cent of the average 
for the territory concerned; 
 
unemployment rate, which must be at least 110 per cent of the average 
for the territory concerned; 
 
as measured over a three-year period; such measurement, however, 
may be a composite one and may include other factors. 
 
(c) assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities24  to new 
environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which 
result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, provided 
that the assistance: 
 
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and 
 
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and 
 
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the 
assisted investment, which must be fully borne by firms; and 
 
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm’s planned 
reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does not cover any 
manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and 
 
(v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment 
and/or production processes. 
 
8.3 A subsidy programme for which the provisions of paragraph 
2 are invoked shall be notified in advance of its implementation to the 
                                                 
23 “Neutral and objective criteria” means criteria which do not favour certain regions beyond what is 
appropriate for the elimination or reduction of regional disparities within the framework of the regional 
development policy.  In this regard, regional subsidy programmes shall include ceilings on the amount 
of assistance which can be granted to each subsidized project.  Such ceilings must be differentiated 
according to the different levels of development of assisted regions and must be expressed in terms of 
investment costs or cost of job creation.  Within such ceilings, the distribution of assistance shall be 
sufficiently broad and even to avoid the predominant use of a subsidy by, or the granting of 
disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to, certain enterprises as provided for in Article2. 
 
24 The term “existing facilities” means facilities which have been in operation for at least two years at 
the time when new environmental requirements are imposed. 
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Committee in accordance with the provisions of Part VII.  Any such 
notification shall be sufficiently precise to enable other Members to 
evaluate the consistency of the programme with the conditions and 
criteria provided for in the relevant provisions of paragraph 2.  
Members shall also provide the Committee with yearly updates of such 
notifications, in particular by supplying information on global 
expenditure for each programme, and on any modification of the 
programme.  Other Members shall have the right to request 
information about individual cases of subsidization under a notified 
programme.25 
 
8.4 Upon request of a Member, the Secretariat shall review a 
notification made pursuant to paragraph 3 and, where necessary, may 
require additional information from the subsidizing Member 
concerning the notified programme under review.  The Secretariat 
shall report its findings to the Committee.  The Committee shall, upon 
request, promptly review the findings of the Secretariat (or, if a review 
by the Secretariat has not been requested, the notification itself), with a 
view to determining whether the conditions and criteria laid down in 
paragraph 2 have not been met.  The procedure provided for in this 
paragraph shall be completed at the latest at the first regular meeting of 
the Committee following the notification of a subsidy programme, 
provided that at least two months have elapsed between such 
notification and the regular meeting of the Committee.  The review 
procedure described in this paragraph shall also apply, upon request, to 
substantial modifications of a programme notified in the yearly updates 
referred to in paragraph 3. 
 
8.5 Upon the request of a Member, the determination by the 
Committee referred to in paragraph 4, or a failure by the Committee to 
make such a determination, as well as the violation, in individual cases, 
of the conditions set out in a notified programme, shall be submitted to 
binding arbitration.  The arbitration body shall present its conclusions 
to the Members within 120 days from the date when the matter was 
referred to the arbitration body.  Except as otherwise provided in this 
paragraph, the DSU shall apply to arbitrations conducted under this 
paragraph. 
 
 
(2) Interpretation 
 
As mentioned already, subsidies that concern specificity and can be used generally are 
non-actionable subsidies and no countervailing measures of any kind can be taken on 
                                                 
25 It is recognized that nothing in this notification provision requires the provision of confidential 
information, including confidential business information. 
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these subsidies.  Even if these subsidies are specific in nature, subsidies aimed at 
research & development, regional development and environmental protection are seen 
as non-actionable subsidies as far as this Agreement concerned.  Countervailing 
actions may be taken against such subsidies if it results in serious adverse effects to 
the economic profits of another member country after it is granted (Ahn and Yoo, p. 
81; Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 60; Yoo, p. 69). 
 
a) Subsidies aimed at research & development in specific areas must meet the 
following conditions in order to be classified as non-actionable.  If the government 
provides for up to 75% of the research costs and/or up to 50% of the development 
costs for “development activities prior to competition” which precedes 
commercialization stages in grants, this shall be seen as a non-actionable subsidy in 
cases of an industrial research done by a higher education institution or a research 
center upon contract with an enterprise. 
 
In this case, the industrial research means researches or studies intended to discover 
useful knowledge in development of new products, new production processes, new 
services or making significant improvements to existing products, production 
processes or services (Ahn and Yoo, p. 82-83; Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 61; 
Yoo, p. 70-71). 
 
Also, “development activities prior to competition” includes substitutable goods, 
service conceptualization, initial testing of designs, and pilot projects.  It does not, 
however, include industrial application or transfer to commercial development or uses.  
Although everyday or regular alterations of existing products, production line, 
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production process, services, and other works may result in improvements through the 
changes but still cannot be considered as “development activities prior to 
competition” (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 61). 
 
In the scope of specific support allowed for instances that include both industrial 
research and pre-competition development activities, the level of support for these 
two activities must not exceed simple average (62.5%).  Also, because this 
Agreement does not apply to basic researches that are expansions of general scientific 
or technological knowledge independently undertaken by higher education institutes 
or research centers, it can be said that they are not subject to regulations on subsidies 
(Ahn and Yoo, p. 83: Yoo, p. 71). 
 
The level of support permitted as research and development subsidies are calculated 
based on the costs incurred throughout development and planning periods.  And, the 
costs on which such calculation is based must have incurred from the following uses. 
 
 Labor costs for researchers, technicians, and other employees hired solely for the 
purposes of research activities;  tools, equipment, land, and building costs that are 
used permanently for research activities;  consultation and services costs used 
solely for research activities including purchased research, technology, intellectual 
property rights; and  other operational costs incurred directly as result of research 
activities.  However, in regard to research and development subsidies, experiences 
and activities of various countries and international organizations will be taken into 
consideration in re-establishing the concepts of major terminology within 18 months 
after the WTO Agreement takes effect (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 61-62). 
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b) Subsidies for regional development are considered to be non-actionable if they are 
granted in a non-specific form in the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 2 with 
disadvantageous regions as the object of designation which objectively based in 
accordance with general regional development plans.  The decision on the judgment 
of disadvantageousness of a region should be made based on objective and 
comprehensive economic development indices that indicate long-term and not 
temporary economic difficulties.  In particular, per capita income for the region for 
the previous 3 years, per capita household earnings, or per capita GDP must be less 
than 85% of the national average.  Or, for the same period, the unemployment rate 
should exceed the national average by 11%.  Further, these regions must be of 
administrative unit that is uniform economically and administratively speaking (Ahn 
and Yoo, p. 84; Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 62; Yoo, p. 72). 
 
The reason for requiring neutral and objective basis is to resolve any regional 
imbalances that may exist while not giving improper level of benefits to any one 
specific region.  So, support conditions for “regional development subsidies” must 
be set differently according to industries and level of development, and support 
repayments should be expressed in terms of investment cost or job creation cost 
concepts.  Such criteria should be clearly stated in acts, regulations or official 
document that can be used as evidence and information on whom the subsidy is 
available to should be widely disseminated in the region in order to prevent recipients 
being limited to specific industries or enterprises.  In particular, subsidies must not 
be tied down to specific small regions that cannot have great effect on the overall 
regional development (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 62). 
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c) Environment subsidy is a one-time support that attempts to get existing facilities 
(factories or buildings) that have been operation for more than 2 years to adjust to 
new environment related laws and regulations and can be as much as up to 20% of the 
improvement costs.  The amount of subsidy is indirectly related to an enterprise’s 
pollution reduction plans and must be in proportion to reductions levels.  Any 
introduction of new equipment, machinery, and production processes must be made 
available and possible for use by all enterprises.  However, costs for operation or 
replacement of equipment and facilities that have received government support before 
is receiving it now so that such future costs must fully be borne by the enterprise 
should be excepted from this (Ahn and Yoo, p. 84; Yoo, p. 72). 
 
Before implementing non-actionable subsidies with specificity, such as research and 
development subsidy, regional development subsidy, and environment subsidy, the 
WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures should be informed of 
the following. 
 
① Type of subsidy (grant, loan, tax reduction/exemption, etc.) 
② Unit value of subsidies, total annual subsidy if unit value is not available (if 
possible, previous year’s unit value indicating average subsidy) or total 
estimated subsidy amount 
③ Policy goals and purpose of subsidy 
④ Period of subsidy to be granted and time schedules set for other subsidies 
⑤ Statistical data for calculation of the trade effects of the proposed subsidy 
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Member countries that make use of non-actionable subsidies with specificity must 
keep the Committee informed of its recent operational statuses every year. In addition, 
information on total cost for individual systems and amendments to the systems from 
the previous year must also be forwarded to the Committee.  Other member 
countries may request information on individual case studies on the systems.  When 
requested by a member country, the WTO Secretariat must review the content of the 
information received by the Committee and request further material from the country 
that plans to grant subsidy when necessary.  The WTO Secretary must inform the 
Committee of the result of its review and the Committee is required to make speedy 
re-review of the conclusions (the conclusion received by the Committee itself if the 
Committee is not requested to go over this material by the Secretariat) reached by the 
WTO Secretariat so that it can make a decision on the appropriateness of the subsidy 
when requested to do so by the Secretariat (Korea Chamber of Commerce, p. 63). 
 
 
VI. KOREA'S INVESTMENT INCENTIVE SYSTEM AND WAYS TO 
IMPROVE 
 
1. Fiscal Incentive 
 
A. Subjects of Tax Reductions/Exemptions  
 
The Foreign Investment Promotion Act, enacted since 17 November 1998, greatly 
expanded upon the tax reductions/exemptions provided by its “predecessor” the 
Foreign Funds Procurement Act in overall content including the period of 
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reduction/exemption and available subjects.  The focal point of tax 
reduction/exemption is the reduction/exemption of corporate tax or earning tax for 
business profits of foreign investment companies.  Generally, when the foreign 
investor is juridical corporation, it is requires to pay corporate taxes while foreign 
investors of private individual statuses are required to pay earnings taxes.  However, 
according to the Foreign Investment Promotion Act, if the foreign investor qualifies as 
eligible for tax reduction/exemption, that foreign investor receives reduction on 
earnings taxes of his/her earnings from the business.  And, those eligible for this tax 
reduction are also eligible for reduction of local taxes and customs duties. 
 
According to the Foreign Investment Promotion Act, those eligible for 
reduction/exemption of corporate taxes are basically limited to investments involving 
new acquirements.  No tax benefits are conferred upon existing share takeover 
methods.  The Foreign Investment Promotion Act sets aside 3 types of businesses as 
eligible for tax benefits.  In the first category are businesses that involve highly 
advanced technology.  In the second are industrial support service businesses that are 
necessary for enhancing national competitiveness.  And in the last category are 
businesses run foreign investment companies located in foreign investment zones.  
In the past, only those dealing with high-tech businesses could receive tax benefits 
and in this sense the range of subjects eligible for tax benefits have been greatly 
expanded (Lee and Lee, p. 78). 
 
B. Content of Tax Reductions/Exemptions 
 
As mentioned previously, the contents of tax reduction/exemptions can be divided 
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into 3 classes.  First is the reduction/exemption of earnings taxes and corporate taxes 
for foreign investment companies on their business earnings.  Second is 
reduction/exemption of local taxes including acquisition tax, registration tax, property 
tax and comprehensive land tax on assets that they acquire or own for the purposes of 
their businesses in Korea.  Third is reduction/exemption of indirect taxes and these 
include customs duties, special consumption tax, and value-added tax on capital 
materials that foreign investment companies introduce in order to run their businesses. 
 
To receive reductions/exemptions on corporate tax, earnings tax and local taxes, the 
foreign investment company needs to apply to the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
(MOFE) indicating the valid time period for which it is eligible to receive these 
benefits (application for tax reduction/exemption).  Or, before taking this step, the 
foreign investment company may find out in advance if it is involved in a business 
that is eligible for tax benefits.  This application is also made to the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (Application for Confirmation of Eligibility for Tax 
Reduction/Exemption).  When requested with such applications, MOFE consults 
with other concerned ministries in making the decision on eligibility and informs the 
applicant of its decision.  Foreign investment companies have asked many questions 
concerning application for confirmation of eligibility for tax benefits.  That is, even 
though they received a positive response to their application for confirmation, they 
later have suspicions about whether they will be sure to receive those the promised 
benefits.  As long as the provisions are clearly stipulated in the related laws and 
regulations, its efficacy is sure and clear.  On the other hand, where local taxes are 
concerned (expansion of reduction and exemptions ranges by local governments), 
MOFE is required to consult with the head of the local government where the 
 58
business proposes to locate itself before letting the foreign investment company know 
of what benefits it is eligible for.  More detailed look into the contents of tax 
reductions/exemptions are as follows (Lee and Lee, p. 79). 
 
(i) Reduction/Exemption of Earnings Taxes 
 
(a) Contents of Reduction/Exemption 
 
The amount (calculated tax due x percentage of foreign investment) of 
reduction/exemption on earnings resulting from businesses eligible for tax 
reduction/exemption run by foreign investment companies is 100% for the first 7 
years and 50% for the next 3 years.  This reduction/exemption takes effect from the 
first year in which earnings are produced.  However, if no earnings are produced for 
the first 5 years, the reduction/exemption is seen to take effect from the day when the 
business first began 5 years ago.  This provision helped to resolve any problems 
arising from foreign investment companies not being able to enjoy tax benefits in the 
early stages of investment. 
 
The same applies to corporate and earnings taxes on dividends from shares acquired 
by foreign investors (sometimes withholding of taxes is also possible) along with 
reduction/exemption of the same taxes on business earnings of sources of those 
dividends (100% for the first 7 years and 50% for the next 3 years) (Lee and Lee, p. 
80). 
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(b) Effects of Tax Reduction/Exemption at the Time of Distribution 
 
① Application of Reduction Rates for Tax Agreements 
 
When foreign investment companies established in Korea distribute dividends to 
shareholders in their native country, 25% source tax is assessed on the dividends in 
relation to corporate and earnings taxes on those dividends.  When the shareholder is 
juridical body, the source tax is assessed on corporate tax and earnings tax for private 
individuals.  However, benefits from corporate taxes may be lost when normal tax 
rates are assessed to foreign investment companies established in Korea in this 
process.  Therefore, in order to maintain the reduction/exemption benefits received 
on corporate taxes at their company level, same reduction/exemptions are applied in 
source taxing of dividends when distributing dividends. 
 
Whether the foreign investor’s country of residence and Korea have reached any tax 
agreements is also an important factor that needs to be considered in looking at the 
effects of tax benefits in assessment of taxes on dividends.  Tax agreements when in 
existence generally provide for reduction of source tax rates on dividends.  Although 
it varies from agreement to agreement, usually 10% source tax rate is the average.  
There is no problem with this for the first 7 years when corporate and earnings taxes 
are exempted because even before the 10% pursuant to tax agreement can be applied, 
complete exemption of dividends has taken place pursuant to the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Act (Lee and Lee, p. 80). 
 
The problem starts in the next 3 years when 50% reduction takes effect.  Because 
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source tax rate of 25% is assesses on 50% reduced which means that 12.5% should be 
assessed.  If 10% is stipulated in a tax agreement, the problem of which rate to apply 
arises.  In the end, 10% is applied since a tax agreement takes priority over domestic 
laws.  Therefore, following a 7-year 100% exemption pursuant to the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Act, the 50% reduction that takes place for the next 3 years 
does not mean much benefit for the foreign investment company if it distributes 
dividends to shareholders in their country of residence.  Of course, this is only the 
case when that country of residence has signed a tax agreement with Korea and the 
rate stipulated in that agreement is lower than 12.5%. 
 
At the same time, during the 7 years when 100% exemption is in effect, the tax 
agreement takes precedence over the domestic law which raises a question of whether 
10% tax rate should apply in this case.  But this does not result in any serious 
dilemma because a tax agreement complies with the international standard that it 
cannot create new tax rights and therefore additional taxes cannot be assessed here.  
In effect, during the 7-year exemption period, foreign investment companies receive 
the full benefit of 100% tax exemption (Lee and Lee, p. 81). 
 
② Tax Sparing System and Effects of Reduction/Exemption for Tax Agreements 
 
The effects of reduction/exemption of corporate and earnings taxes provided to 
foreign investment companies may vary depending on what the double taxation 
prevention methods applied to foreign investment companies are in a tax agreement 
signed between the two countries and whether tax sparing system is guaranteed by the 
tax agreement in cases tax deduction methods are applied. 
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Assuming that all earnings produced in a tax year are to be distributed out in 
dividends, when earnings deduction method is applied (e.g. where a German 
investment company establishes a company in Korea pursuant to the tax agreement 
signed between Korea and Germany), the exemption of corporate taxes in Korea is 
enjoyed by the investor.   
 
On the other hand, if tax deduction method is applied, the reduction/exemption of 
corporate taxes in Korea in the absence of tax sparing system, it only has the effect of 
expanding taxes in the country of foreign investor’s residence.  Therefore, when 
dividends are distributed without a tax sparing system, the foreign investor cannot 
make any use of the fiscal incentives provided by Korea.  The tax sparing system can 
be good in that in can lead to profit-making in corporate stages in Korea.  In a 
situation where profits are distributed and no tax benefits can be enjoyed, the profits 
will be reinvested in Korea (Lee and Lee, p. 81-82). 
 
(ii) Reduction/Exemption of Local Taxes 
 
Reduction/exemption of local taxes means reduction/exemption of acquisition tax, 
registration tax, property tax and comprehensive land tax on assets that a foreign 
investment company acquires or owns for its business operations.  In particular, 
because the comprehensive land tax is accumulative in structure in tax calculation, 
reduction/exemption occurs via deduction of related assets from the tax standards. 
 
The basic reduction of local taxes is 100% for the first 5 years from the 
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commencement of business and 50% for the next 3 years.  However, local 
governments may extend the period of reduction/exemption to 15 years pursuant to 
Article 9 or the Local Tax Act (cases for exemption of taxes, needs approval from the 
Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs), and may should it choose 
offer higher rates of reduction/exemption (Lee and Lee, p. 82). 
 
(iii) Reduction/Exemption of Customs Duties, etc. 
 
Refers to exemption of customs duties/special consumption taxes and value-added 
taxes that are assessed in the clearance process in relation to introduction of capital 
materials to be used in the business of foreign investment company eligible for tax 
benefits.  The value-added tax mentioned here is the import value-added tax (Lee 
and Lee, p. 82). 
 
 
2. Financial Incentives 
 
In addition to fiscal incentives, foreign investment companies may also receive other 
supports from the central government or local governments in relation to factory 
construction and employment.  Supports other than reductions and/or exemptions of 
taxes that are available are financial incentives, which consist of support concerning 
lease and sale of national or public properties, local government subsidies, etc. 
 
A. Incentives Related to Leases and Sellings of State/Public Properties 
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The Minister of Finance and Economy, administrators of national properties, and 
heads of local governments (in case of public properties) may regardless of State 
Property Act and Local Economy Act sign private contracts with foreign investment 
companies to lease or sell state-owned or public-owned land, buildings, etc. 
 
(i) Extension and Installment on Payment 
 
When selling, due date for sales payment may be postponed or payment may be made 
in installments.  The concerned Enforcement Decree stipulates that in cases of state 
properties, it may be postponed for up to 1 year and 20 years installment plan.  For 
public properties owned by local governments, the postponement and installment 
periods may be set according to regulations or precedents (Lee and Lee, p. 84). 
 
(ii)  Reduction/Exemption of Rents for State Properties 
 
State properties can be leased for up to 50 years and rents may be reduced or 
exempted.  The Minister of Finance and Economy and administrators of state 
properties may consult and agree to reduce or exempt rents for state properties 
(restricted to land in foreign investment zones, foreign companies-only industrial 
complexes, national industrial complexes, etc.).  Foreign investment companies that 
wish to enjoy such benefits should apply for it with the administrator of the respective 
state property.  The Enforcement Decree sets out 3 different levels of 
reduction/exemption for state properties. 
 
Reduction of up to 100 %: Business that contributes significantly to increasing 
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employment rate or national economy that (a) is a business operated by a foreign 
investment company in a foreign investment zone, (b) business that has received tax 
reduction/exemption of corporate tax and etc. whose investment value is over 
US$1,000,000. 
 
Reduction of up to 75%: Business that contributes significantly to increasing 
employment rate or national economy that (a) is a business in which a foreign investor 
plans to operate a manufacturing company with a value of over US$10 million, (b) is 
a business that contributes significantly to expansion of social infrastructures, 
coordination of industrial structure or to financial independence of a local government 
(decided upon deliberation of the Foreign Investment Committee). 
 
Reduction of up to 50%: In cases of leasing state properties located within national 
industrial complexes (Lee and Lee, p. 85). 
 
(iii) Reduction/Exemption of Rents for Public Properties and Discounted Parceling 
Prices 
 
(a) Contents 
 
In case of reductions on rental charges of public properties, the details, including 
eligibility and reduction rates, depend on the effects on the creation of jobs, transfer of 
technology, and financial independence of local governments among other economic 
effects tat foreign investment bring and are decided by local governments after taking 
all these factors into consideration. 
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The local government, along with the reduction of rental charges, may offer discounts 
on parceling out prices also.  If a public organ (project company of a industrial 
complex development project as provided for in items 1 and 2 of paragraph 2 of 
Article 16 of the Act on Industrial Locationing and Development) stipulated by the 
Enforcement Decree may rent lands and etc. that it owns to foreign investment 
companies at reduced rates or offer discounted parceling out prices and the local 
government may assist in making up the differences incurred from such reductions 
(Lee and Lee, p. 85). 
 
(b) Revised Working Rules on Precedents (Regulations) on Management of 
Public Properties Owned by Local Governments 
 
The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) newly 
prepared the legal foundation (Article 92-2) for reduction of rental fees and etc. for 
properties owned by local governments via amendment of Enforcement Decree of the 
Local Finance Act on 16 July 1998.  Following this, guidelines on reduction of rental 
fees for lands owned by local governments was handed down to tem on 0 August.  
The local government were guided to reflect the contents of MOGAHA’s revisions in 
their regulations that were to be revised by the end of September. 
 
A local government may shall decide discounted parceling out prices and reduction of 
rental fees or investment, creation of jobs, and export costs of foreign investors (Lee 
and Lee, p. 86). 
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(a) Parceling Out Price: ranging from 25% to 100% 
 
Basis  100% reduction 75% reduction 50% reduction 
Investment amount  > US$20 mil. US$10 – 20 mil. US$ 5 – 10 mil. 
Creation of jobs  > 300  > 200 > 100 
Export rate  100% > 75% > 50% 
Domestic procurement rate 100% > 75% > 50% 
 
 
(b) Rental fees: ranging from 50% to 100% 
 
Basis  100% reduction 75% reduction 50% reduction 
Investment amount     
Creation of jobs  > 1,000  > 500 > 300 
Export rate  100% --- > 50% 
Domestic procurement rate --- > 70% > 50% 
Source: Lee and Lee, p. 86 
 
 
B. Various Subsidies 
 
According to the Foreign Investment Promotion Act, a local government may grant 
employment subsidies and etc. to foreign investment companies when needed to 
promote foreign investment, as provided for in regulations and the Enforcement 
Decree.  The Enforcement Decree defines this employment subsidy as subsidy 
granted following and in proportion to the size of new jobs created. 
 
Further, a local government may grant subsidies other than employment subsidy, such 
as education & training subsidy, etc.  There is no information as yet on different 
types of subsidies offered by local governments (Lee and Lee, p. 87). 
 
 
3. Incentives Provided to Foreign Investment Zones 
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A. Criteria for Designation of Foreign Investment Zones 
 
A mayor or governor may, in order to induce foreign investments prescribed in the 
Enforcement Decree, when necessary designate certain areas/zones where foreign 
investors have shown interest in making their investments as foreign investment zones 
upon deliberation by the Foreign Investment Committee. 
 
Foreign investments that are subject of foreign investment zone designations as 
stipulated by the Enforcement Decree are manufacturing businesses or establishment 
of new factory facilities for operation of businesses that are subject to tax reductions 
or exemptions, and meeting any one of the following conditions. 
 
 Amount of foreign investment is over $100 million 
 Foreign investment company with foreign investment ratio of over 1:2 (>50%) 
and with employment size if over 1,000 at all times 
 Foreign investment company with foreign investment of over $50 million and 
with employment size if over 500 at all times 
 Foreign investment company with foreign investment of over $30 million and with 
employment size if over 300 at all times (only applies when parts or all of national 
industrial complexes or local government industrial complexes being designated as 
foreign investment zones) 
Source: Lee and Lee, p. 89 
 
The Enforcement Decree, aside from these manufacturing businesses and industrial 
support service businesses, allows for the designation of foreign investment zones for 
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construction of tourism, hotel and international conference facilities with an 
investment value of over $30 million and for foreign investments valued at over $50 
million that are invested in construction of facilities for resort businesses in areas 
designated by the provincial government of Cheju or by acts under the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy. 
 
When a mayor or a governor wishes to designate a foreign investment zone, he/she 
must prepare a designation plan or a development plan (for local industrial 
complexes) and submit it to the Minister of Finance and Economy (Lee and Lee, p. 
90). 
 
When a foreign investment company that has moved into a foreign investment zone is 
not able to meet the conditions of designation criteria, including total investment 
value and employment size, the mayor or governor may set a certain period within a 
6-month range and request the foreign investment company to satisfy those conditions 
by the date given.  If a foreign investment company does not satisfy the criteria 
within the given time period, the mayor or the governor must cancel the designation 
of that foreign investment zone upon deliberation of the Foreign Investment 
Deliberation Committee.  However, when there are unavoidable circumstances 
prevent the foreign investment meeting those requirements with the given time, the 
foreign investment company may be given one-time extension of the originally given 
time period (Lee and Lee, p. 90). 
 
B. Incentives Provided to Foreign Investment Zones 
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When a foreign investment is designated as foreign investment zone, it is able to 
enjoy almost all benefits conferred by the Foreign Investment Promotion Act.  
Companies operating from these zones will receive the same tax 
reductions/exemptions granted to businesses involved in advanced technology and 
industrial support services.  It may also receive reductions/exemptions when 
purchasing, being allotted or renting factory sites, in addition to various other 
subsidies. 
 
In addition to these fiscal and financial incentives, foreign investors located in these 
designated zones may also receive conveniences related to expansion of fundamental 
facilities and support.  Article 19 of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act contains 
the provisions on other supports provided to foreign investment zones.  Costs and 
burdens that go into developing foreign investment zones, as well as supports building 
of ports, roads, irrigation facilities, railroads, communication & electric facilities.  
Further, Traffic Inducement Fee, pursuant to Urban Traffic Readjustment Promotion 
Act, is exempted for facilities and building structures located within foreign 
investment zones. 
 
Mayors/governors or organization in charge of managing foreign investment zones 
must give priority to the convenience of foreign investors or foreign investment 
companies in their considerations.  They are also required to make active efforts to 
expand various infrastructures, including financial institutions, information & 
communication facilities, and logistics facilities, that are needed to support their 
businesses.  Full support should also provided to foreign investors or foreign 
companies with medical facilities, educational facilities, and housing (Lee and Lee, p. 
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90-91). 
 
Article 20 of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act stipulates special provisions 
which prevent other acts and administrative regulations from applying to foreign 
investment zones.  For example, in relation to division of land with foreign 
investment zones, restrictive measures provided for in other acts such as the Act on 
the Utilization and Management of the National Territory.  And, businesses operating 
from these designated zones are recognized as having registered as trade or trading 
agent businesses so that easing import/export restrictions stipulated by the Foreign 
Trade Act.  Duty-free import for exports to bonded areas is also allowed for foreign 
investment zones (Lee and Lee, p. 91). 
 
 
4. State's Support to Local Governments on Their Foreign Investment Inducing 
Activities 
 
The government’s policy on supporting local governments in their activities to induce 
foreign investment is to provide the maximum support possible when requested by 
local governments.  The government may loan them the money needed to purchase 
lands to be rented to foreign investors, rent land at reduced rates, give discounts on 
parceling out prices, subsidize education and training fees, provide other subsidies, 
and help with other funds needed for inducing foreign investment.  Local 
governments may also received assistance in 4 other areas. 
 
Criteria and procedures for providing financial support to local governments are 
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decided by the Foreign Investment Deliberation Committee in accordance with the 
Enforcement Decree.  The Enforcement Decree stipulates that the Committee is to 
consider all factors, including the economic effects of the foreign investment (e.g. 
creation of jobs, transfer of technology, etc.) and location conditions in establishing 
the criteria and procedures.  Therefore, specific details on these criteria and 
procedures have not been decided yet.  The Foreign Investment Promotion Act does 
however state that the efforts and performance records of local governments in 
inducing foreign investment should be considered in setting criteria for financial 
support (Lee and Lee, p. 95). 
 
 
 
4. WTO AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR KOREA'S FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
 
Previous Chapters discussed in detail incentive systems introduced to Korea its effort 
to induce foreign investment and about the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.  The question here is whether there is any possibility for 
these new investment incentives seen in the light of the WTO Agreement can be 
posed as trade issues.  That is, is Korea’s newly introduced incentive system in 
conformity with the WTO Agreement or is it or are any parts of not consistent with 
the WTO Agreement? 
 
There have been no cases where non-conformities between investment incentives and 
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the WTO Agreement that grew into international trade disputes.  That is, to date, no 
countries have complained to the WTO that tax benefits or subsidies granted for 
foreign investment inducement purposes by another country in jurisdiction harmed the 
former country in any way, nor has any country ever taken countervailing measures 
against another country.  A comprehensive look at international disputes concerning 
subsidies has shown that there is no clear answer as to whether investment incentives 
cause any complications in WTO Agreement on Subsidies.  It can therefore be 
concluded that no clear internationally recognized criteria or positions on foreign 
investment and investment incentives have been presented so far. 
 
Although it has not been raised as an international issue yet, seeing that more and 
more countries are providing more and more incentives in order to induce more 
investment in their own countries, there is real and noteworthy enough possibility of 
disputes arising from non-conformities between investment incentives offered and 
implementation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
Seen from this perspective, it is important that Korea takes a look at its new 
investment incentives and see if it goes against any part of the WTO Agreement and 
make any revisions necessary in order to prevent potential disputes from surfacing. 
 
The question of how well investment incentives suit the WTO Agreement should be 
answered by reviewing in detail the WTO Agreement sections on subsidies against 
investment incentives offered by Korea. 
 
The first area to be studied is whether the investment incentives fall under the 
category of prohibitive subsidies.  In the WTO Agreement, the most representative 
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prohibitive subsidies are import and export related subsidies that are granted 
according to import/export performances.  One, at least, of the incentives offered by 
Korea are prohibitive in character.  The incentive at issue is reduction/exemption of 
parceling out prices and rents on public properties owned by local governments.  In 
the management regulations regarding local government owned public properties 
proposed by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs 
(MOGAHA) to the local governments on July 16, 1998, MOGAHA stated that 
reduction/exemption of rents or parceling out prices for public properties be based on 
export rate and domestic procurement rate.  Conditions for provision of such 
incentives clearly fall under WTO Agreement as export subsidies and import transfer 
subsidies, and therefore can be said to be prohibitive subsidies.  Hence, if foreign 
investment companies that were granted these types of subsidies were to export their 
goods, the importing country has every right to raise complaints.  This means that 
MOGAHA’s management regulations regarding public properties should be revised to 
delete the basis on which the benefits are granted.  That is remove export rate and 
domestic procurement rates from its contents. 
 
Next matter to look at is whether any of Korea’s incentives can be categorized as 
countervailable.  The following 3 aspects should be considered in making a 
judgment on this.  First, does making this incentive available only to foreign 
investors give it specificity?  Second, if no to the first, does the incentive in its 
present form pose any specificity issues?  Third, if yes to the second, how can it be 
revised to remove that specificity? 
 
To date, there have been no international precedents regarding the first question from 
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which can be said that there is no clear basis on which a judgment can be made.  But 
in light of international trends so far and considering that specificity is related to very 
concrete and real criteria like specific enterprises and industries, it does no seem as if 
that specificity will be met simply by the fact that investment incentive may be 
granted to all foreign investors. 
 
The second question is the focal point of this thesis since it involves the contents of 
the incentive to be granted to foreign investors.  The decision on specificity of 
investment incentives may be treated individually according to different types of 
incentives.  As analyzed already, Korea's investment incentives mostly make use of 
tax reductions or exemptions and can be divided into two main categories.  One is 
tax benefits given to businesses involving advanced technology and industrial support 
services.  The other is tax benefits to foreign investors located in foreign investment 
zones. 
 
As for tax benefits given to businesses involving advanced technology and industrial 
support services, seeing that the recipients of this incentive consist of 500 subdivided 
industries by a government notice, it is hard to deny that this incentive it is being 
granted only to specific industries.  Therefore, it is very likely that specificity as 
defined by the WTO Agreement will be recognized for this incentive and 
improvements should be made to eliminate such industrial specificity from the 
incentive.  Application of standards suggested by the US International Trade 
Commission may be one method of doing that.  That is, do not set recipients as 
certain specific industries but base them on more neutral and objective standards (e.g. 
high-tech industries or small and medium enterprises).  For example, do not divide 
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the high technology industries and industrial support service businesses into 
subdivisions, but alter the standards to indicate that eligible recipients shall be 
industries with technologies surpassing domestic industries.  This type of 
rectification method has already been chosen and is being practiced by Singapore. 
 
Incentives provided to foreign investment zones may not pose any problems as far as 
its basic objectives are concerned because they are offered to any enterprise that 
moves into a certain location to do business.  It this sense, no specificity is detected 
here.  However, complication could arise from the fact that even this type of 
incentive in practical sense is not based on a regional concept as it initially appears to 
be.  That is the recipient enterprise is selected first, then foreign investment zone is 
designated later, making it an incentive fitting the characters of individual industries 
and leaving some doubt as to whether specificity exists or not.  Subsidies whose 
related laws and regulations generally have objective and neutral conditions like the 
number of employees or size of enterprise, or whose recipients are automatically 
selected are seen to be non-specific.  And seen from this perspective, when 
incentives provided to foreign investment zones are based on such objective criteria, 
then there is not question of specificity.  Korea's Foreign Investment Promotion Act 
faces no problems with specificity in this sense because the Act clearly states those 
objective and neutral conditions. 
 
In conclusion, Korea's investment incentive system may be in conflict with some 
provisions of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  Such 
conflicts, or non-conformities, as pointed out in the previous sections should be 
amended as soon as possible in the following way.  First, delete export rate and 
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domestic procurement rate criteria from incentives related to reduction/exemption of 
rents and parceling prices for public properties owned by local governments.  
Second, adopt a much wider concept of industries for incentives provided to business 
dealing with high technology and industrial support services. 
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